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A Technological Enquiry into Inequality
A Conceptual Review
Abstract
This paper is a conceptual review around the relationship between 
technology and inequality. It underscores the necessity to bring together 
two concerns: how we need to improve our understanding of  inequality 
with respect to technology, and how we need to improve our understanding 
of  technology in terms of  inequality. The paper provides a review of  the 
core themes that are associated with the relationship between technology 
and inequality, such as the conceptual foundations of  technology and 
its role in heralding modernity, its social context, its relationship with 
human agency, the notion of  the digital divide, technological inequality in 
India, and the instrumentality of  digital communication technologies. We 
see how technologies can emerge as a new site for modern incarnations 
of  inequality, given how they are a realm of  experience and activity not 
separate from the social. We see how technology interbreeds with existing 
inequalities by virtue of  the fact that it is not simply a set of  artefacts or 
assets but an integral social participant. We see, in this paper, why we need 
to critique the mainstream Indian discourse and meta-narrative around these 
realities to bring out the true nature of  the relationship between technology 
and inequality. This paper finally provokes a series of  questions that are 
pertinent to get a grasp of  the interface between technology, inequality, 
and development.
Keywords
Technology, Inequality, Modernity, Socio-Technology, Agency, Capabilities and 
Functionings, Digital Divide, Socio-Technological Inequality
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Introduction 
Social and economic inequality are born 
of  a range of  historical factors and policy 
decisions, and in turn have procreated 
a brood of  maladies that are entwined 
with the development trajectory of  India. 
Disempowerment in political-economic 
life, aggravated labour and livelihood 
vulnerability, and the marginalisation of  
certain socio-economic groups are some 
of  the most glaring manifestations and 
progenies of  inequality, all nourished 
by traditional and novel sources of  
social and economic power imbalances. 
Similarly, new employment patterns 
(arising out of  agrarian distress 
and migration to the urban), bleak 
economic aspirat ional  openings, 
reconfiguration of  family structures 
(due to increasing distress migration, 
informality, inequality, urbanity), issues 
of  ecological sustainability, and finally 
the future intergenerational impact 
that all these disquieting trends have, in 
multiple dimensions, garnered interest 
from policy, academia, journalism, 
the arts, and popular discourse. The 
economic analysis of  inequality has 
also been interwoven with sociological 
studies on the contemporary character 
and operationalisation of  caste, class, 
and gender, and their intersections. 
There have recently also been novel 
theorisations of  inequality, and sufficient 
international attention has been accorded 
to the condition and context in India. 
However, one aspect of  inequality that 
has been relatively understudied has 
been the technological dimension, as 
there has been woefully insufficient 
(possibly even misdirected) attention to 
the impact of  socio-economic inequality 
on technological outcomes. Hence, a first 
question that arises is: what has been the 
instrumentality of  inequality in the technological 
condition in India?
Technology – particularly digital 
technology – has emerged in academic 
research and policy formulations as 
one of  the principal stimulants that 
drives individuals and groups on the 
path towards modernity, empowerment, 
and prosperity. However, the greater 
part of  the research on technology 
and development in India has lacked 
either depth or scope by restricting to 
the quantifiable, the economic, and 
the tangible; only very few studies (and 
almost no policy documents) have 
departed from this trinity. Debates 
and statistics around formal R&D 
statistics, industrial innovation, digital- 
and infor mat ion-technolog y- led 
interventions, and other such themes, 
take up the larger share of  academic 
and policy studies. Preoccupations 
with prescriptive-technology research, 
interventions in rural economic sectors, 
digital governance, and international 
comparisons on technology devoid of  
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context have created an aura around the 
very idea of  technology that has inclined 
towards oversimplification, technological 
determinism, and solutionism. Evidently, 
there has been little in the way of  
historicisation, sociological enquiry, and 
political critique around technology and 
development in India. A serious enquiry 
stares at us as a second question – what 
has been the instrumentality of  technological 
outcomes and technological trajectories in socio-
economic inequality in India?
We therefore have two questions 
that need to be wedded. We need to 
improve our understanding of  inequality 
with respect to technology, and we 
need to improve our understanding of  
technology in terms of  inequality. Hence, 
this review paper hopes to deepen the 
theorisation, and improve granularity, 
of  the empirical investigation around 
the relationship between technology and 
inequality in contemporary India. We 
need to ask – what is our understanding 
of  technology? Does socio-political 
context matter? Does it empower 
human agency? What genuinely are 
‘technological inequalities’? In what 
follows, I provide a review of  these and 
other core themes that are associated with 
the relationship between technology and 
inequality, which include the conceptual 
foundations of  technology and its role 
in heralding modernity, its social context, 
its relationship with human agency, the 
notion of  the digital divide, and the 
instrumentality of  digital communication 
technologies. 
As indicated in the figure above, 
this paper progresses from the very 
idea of  technology to the triad of  
technology-inequality-development. 
That is, I first visit definitions and 
conceptualisations of  technology (in 
terms of  actor-network theory, social 
construction of  technology, and the 
politics of  technology), identify what 
purpose the literature has accorded to 
technology (in terms of  modernity, 
agency, and development), how 
studies so far have grasped the nature 
of  its instrumentality (in terms of  
capability and functionings, and in 
capital creation), and finally to how 
the problematisation of  inequality 
has been critiqued (in terms of  the 
digital divide and socio-technological 
inequality). This conceptual review then 
provokes a series of  questions that are 
pertinent to get a grasp of  the interface 

















Technology has become an established 
part of  contemporary thinking as 
an apparatus to assess the human 
condition.1 Whether one is a utopian, 
sceptic, contextualist, or determinist in 
one’s stand towards the instrumentality 
of  technology, certain commonalities 
nonetheless hold: such as its extension 
(desirable or not) of  ourselves and our 
capabilities and intentions, and its role 
in transformation of  people and the 
diverse worlds we inhabit.2 Following 
this, technologies are conceptualised 
as individual goods, social goods, and 
global goods, earning a significant place 
in the daily lives of  people everywhere.3 
There arises, then, the question (alluded 
to Jean-Paul Sartre) of  ‘what we make’ 
of  technology in development, both in 
terms of  what we can decide and what 
we must decide, and whether we sincerely 
wish technology to improve individuals’ 
microclimates in a macro-landscape of  
aggravating inequality.4 There also arises 
the need to conceive of  technology as an 
arena of  power, conflict, struggle, and 
negotiation, a realisation which will also 
urge us to depart from a largely Western 
(or industrial-economic) tradition of  
1 Ingold 1997
2 Zheng, 2009; Toyama 2015
3 Arnold 2013
4 Toyama 2015; Krishna 2017
comprehending technology, to exploring 
and conceptualising its alternative 
cultural meanings in the context of  the 
people using and experiencing them.5 
Let us take a look at how the very 
concept of  technology itself  (aside 
from its role in development) has been 
conceived, with a universalistic starting 
point of  understanding ‘technology’ 
as any alteration6 to nature, based on, 
and furthering, that understanding of  
nature. 
John Desmond Bernal7 viewed 
a ‘technique’ as a set of  individually 
acquired and socially secured methods 
of  doing something (whereas ‘science’ 
was a way of  understanding how to do 
it, consequently therefore to improve 
technique in turn); ‘techniques’ could 
have public-goods characteristics, are 
certainly embedded in social relations, 
and are much wider than merely high-
complexity industrial or mechanical 
inventions (or having ‘high social 
impact’) thereby including even new 
processes.8 This seems to echo an 
earlier conceptualisation by Lewis 
Mumford. In Technics and Civilization, 
5 Feenberg 1999, 2010; Fortunati 2008; Faulkner 
et al. 2010; Lupton 2015
6 Alterations that are not necessarily of  human 
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Mumford9 adhered to the Greek 
‘tekhne’ and broadened the relationship 
between technological innovation and 
social environment beyond industrial 
processes, thereby including even art, 
skill, and dexterity. Much later, and quite 
similarly, Tim Ingold demonstrated how 
‘tekhne’ (art and skill associated with 
craftsmanship) and ‘logos’ (framework 
of  principles derived from the 
application of  reason) were combined to 
denote the art of  reason, which has now 
evolved to instead denote the reason of  
art; in any case, technology remains the 
application of  the mechanics of  nature, 
derived through scientific enquiry, to 
the ends of  expressive art.10 
A narrower Schumpeterian 
conceptualisation explains technological 
innovation as comprised of  invention 
(conceptualisation of  novelty), 
innovation (commercialisation of  the 
invention) and diffusion (adoption and 
spread of  the invention or innovation).11 
Similar (but not as narrow) artefactual 
conceptualisations distinguish three 
layers of  the meaning of  ‘technology’ 
– physical objects or artefacts or 
systems, the knowledge or activities 
or processes around them, and the 
9 Mumford 1934
10 Ingold 1997: 130-132
11 Mejia 2017
practices of  handling them.12 Adopting 
this approach allows us to understand 
the direct extension of  physical faculties 
(through tools and artefacts), the 
extension of  cognitive capabilities, and 
the extension of  intentions (whereby 
people develop artefacts as a means to 
realise their intentions).13
However, in Martin Heidegger’s 
conceptualisation, technology was 
not simply an artefactual innovation 
or instrument, and whose essence has 
much more than simply ‘technical’ or 
attributable entirely to innovation, and 
which cannot be reduced to either 
the instrumental or anthropological 
components of  its character. 
Technology, Heidegger14 explains, is 
a mode of  understanding, a mode of  
being and revealing, and a state of  mind. 
He warns that we cannot blindly rely 
on technology to solve by itself  every 
existential crisis that humanity faces, 
but at the same time we must not slip 
into complacency to the point where 
we assume that we will always have the 
technological capacity to solve problems 
in the present and future. Comprised 
of  skills, techniques, methods, and 
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processes, technology15 thereby actually 
has four ‘causes’ – materialis (materials 
and data), formalis (methods or forms), 
efficiens (the owner or creator) and 
finalis (the users or reasons) – which 
bring something into appearance, 
letting it come forth into presencing, to 
unconcealment, and finally to revelation 
(what he terms ‘poieses’). Enframing, 
finally, emerges as the essence of  
modern technology which end up being 
mostly technique-led.
At this point, let us turn towards 
an anthropological approach to 
understanding technology. Bryan 
Pfaffenberger16 proposed that a 
society’s material culture is an indicator 
of  its physical record of  adaptation, as 
well as the means by which it effects its 
reproduction. Techniques and material 
culture, he continues, includes material 
resources, tools, operational sequences, 
skills, verbal and non-verbal knowledge; 
this does not operate alone, but is 
intermeshed with the social coordination 
of  labour that operates within what he 
terms a ‘socio-technical system’ – a 
concept employed throughout in this 
paper.
15 Threats to our own existence, Heidegger argues, 
arise when humankind increasingly brackets 
progress and advance, and our relationship with 
nature, only through technology.
16 Pfaffenberger 1988 and 1992
There are other notions that ascribe 
an instrumental role for technology 
in laying the path towards ‘the good 
life,’ but these reveal themselves to 
be facile because there are as many 
conceptions of  technology as there are 
of  ‘the good life.’17 Bereft of  virtue or 
vice by itself, as stated by Kranzberg18 
who famously stated how technology 
is “neither good nor bad; nor is it 
neutral,” it can neither be universalised 
as a development instrument, nor 
pushed into simplistic correlations 
between acquisition and development, 
nor cast as some ‘ultimately desirable 
functioning,’ nor (as will be reflected 
upon in a later section in this paper) an 
assured harbinger or modernity.19 Just 
as erroneously, representing technology 
as adhering to a defined path (linear 
or otherwise) of  peaks and troughs in 
its life-cycle is problematic, because 
such a simplistic conceptualisation is 
ignorant of  variation, unpredictability, 
reconfiguration, and social context.20 
Therefore, context dependency 
becomes central in the definition and 
analysis of  technology. This is where 
we must turn to Langdon Winner. In 
his acclaimed work ‘Do Artifacts Have 
17 Basalla 1989; van den Hoven 2012
18 Kranzberg 1986
19 Zheng 2007 and 2009
20 Borup et al. 2006
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Politics’21, Winner compellingly argued 
for including social context, or more 
specifically the social determination 
of  technology. He proposed that it 
was as important to study the social 
circumstances of  technology as an 
“obvious wisdom”,22 certainly not by 
universal reductionism to social forces, 
but to identify the social and (more 
importantly) the political within the 
technological. Any given technology 
unavoidably brings in human 
relationships that have entrenched 
political qualities, such that adopting a 
technological system generally requires 
the openness to, and compatibility with, a 
set of  socio-political conditions because 
technologies are invariably linked to 
particular institutionalised systems 
and patterns of  power. Embedding 
the understanding of  the nature 
and instrumentality of  technology 
in structures of  social power and 
prevailing normative systems eschews 
technocratic and naturalistic tendencies, 
fetishism in conceptualising technology, 
as well as the ‘technology as solution’ 
approach, all of  which propound 
the assumption that its outcomes in 
terms of  improvements of  life are 
universalistic and equitably benefited 
by all, ignoring the social conditions 
21 Winner 1980
22  Winner 1980: 29
that determine access and impact.23 In 
reality, technologies enter and operate 
within complex sociological and political 
ecologies (right from the home to 
large communities), and negotiate with 
grids of  social meaning.24 Technology 
is, largely, a social practice that often 
mirrors social differentiation and 
cleavages by being structured through 
social categories (such as gender, class, 
location, ethnicity, etc.) and, surely, 
also feeds back in to those political 
and power relations by configuring 
social life in turn.25 Individuals make 
technological choices within their social 
contexts, often upturning the intentions 
of  the developers of  those technological 
artefacts.26 
Hence, technologies have no 
life by themselves – the way societies 
embrace them is what matters; some 
technologies are political in their 
entirety.27 Return to Pfaffenberger28, we 
must adopt the view that technology 
is, therefore, ‘humanised nature’ and 
hence a ‘total social phenomenon’29. 
Every technology is “a human world...
to construct a technology is not merely 
23 Beck 1992; Ingold 1997; Heeks 1999; Warschauer 
2003
24 Bell 2006a, 2006b
25 Castells et al. 2007; Lupton 2015
26 Schwartz-Cowan 1987
27 MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999
28 Pfaffenberger 1988 and 1992
29 Attributed to Marcel Mauss
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to deploy materials and techniques; it is 
also to construct social and economic 
alliances, to invent new legal principles 
for social relations, and to provide 
powerful new vehicles for culturally-
provided myths”.30
To pursue a more effective analysis 
of  technology, given these sociological 
contexts and political characteristics, we 
must draw from the feminist tradition 
in technological analysis which not only 
opens up the essentially gendered nature 
of  technological artefacts, but also at 
large the sociological factors that shape 
technological devices and experiences, 
as well as how technology reflects those 
sociological divisions and cleavages.31 
As the work of  Ruth Schwartz-Cowan 
and Judy Wajcman have convincingly 
revealed, technology and sociological 
variables (gender being but one) are not 
separate realms but products of  moving 
relational processes emerging from 
individual and collective relationships 
with technology that are influenced by 
meaning ascribed to technology across 
sites. In the utopian discourses that often 
circulate in mainstream accounts of  
technological successes and possibilities, 
such socio-political aspects of  these 
technologies are glaringly missing.32 
However much the mainstream 
30 Praffenberger 1988: 249
31 Wajcman 2010
32 Lupton 2015
discourses around technology attempt 
to divorce technology and society and 
argue that the former independently 
influences the latter, a more realistic and 
grounded approach must be adopted 
that recognises the primacy and co-
constitutiveness of  social structures 
as part and parcel of  technological 
trajectories and outcomes.33 Technology 
thus rides on, and amplifies social 
processes and practices, even if  it does 
not advance for structural reform or 
undermine existing social order.34 What 
is needed, therefore, is a socio-technological 
analysis that sees society and technology 
as a seamless web that is mutually 
connected and continuously interlinked, 
with enough flexibility to accommodate 
for the derivativeness of  either.35 In 
order to comprehend the ‘seamless web’ 
of  society and technology, we call upon 
two influential frameworks – Actor-
Network Theory (ANT) and Social 
Construction of  Technology (SCOT). 
Let us introduce the basic tenets 
of  Actor-Network Theory developed 
by Michel Callon and Bruno Latour. 
While we do not adopt this paradigm 
wholesale to our analysis on technology 
and inequality, we find value in drawing 
from its founding principles when 
understanding the sociological context 
33 Warschauer 2003
34 Veak 2000; Warschauer 2003; Toyama 2015
35 Bijker et al. 1987; Arnold 2013
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of  technology, or interpreting the 
nature of  technology itself; this, in turn, 
enriches our enquiry on technology 
and inequality. In what follows, we 
draw from Latour, Callon, and Strum, 
who are in turn inspired by Gabriel 
Tarde, Harold Garfinkel, Wiebe Bijker, 
and John Law.36 In order to succeed 
in tracing a technology throughout 
its experience, it is most appropriate 
to study not only society (not even 
simply social relationships), but actor-
networks that procreate both society 
and technology; this implies that we 
cannot, truthfully, begin with society 
or social aggregates (and certainly not 
with technology either), but with we 
must seek to understand associations 
in society that are between social and 
non-social actors. Of  course, such an 
approach does not claim that non-social 
actors (artefacts) ‘replace’ people, but 
that we must treat them as ‘participants’ 
in social assemblages – the domain 
of  the social is much more extensive 
than just humans. That is, social ties 
are comprised as much about human-
artefact (or even artefact-artefact) 
connections as much as human-human 
connections, because artefacts are 
actants that make a difference (which can 
36 Latour 2005; Callon 2012; Strum and Latour 
1987; Gabriel Tarde 1899/2000; Garfinkel 1967; 
Bijker 1995, among others; John Law 1992, 
among others.
be measured or assessed) in the course 
of  a human agent’s actions. Artefacts 
ought to be given a ‘social thought’ in 
the general analysis, because they are 
knitted with social ties to humans, they 
are often what glue together that which 
we call ‘the social,’ they help provide the 
durability, solidity, and inertia that society 
erroneously attributes to itself, and 
hence deserve a dedicated exploration 
into what humans are doing with 
them. What must be explored with as 
intensely as human relations in a society 
are how human-technological relations 
are interlaced to build and produce a 
society. As Garfinkel and Tarde had 
urged, long prior to the development 
of  ANT, we need to understand what 
is actually holding society together, 
instead of  slipping into the convenient 
assumption that society (as only human 
assemblages) can help explain conditions 
or can address political issues. Drawing 
from observations of  primate societies, 
who also use tools (i.e., technologies), 
we understand that when observing the 
complexity of  society, that which we 
call ‘primitive’ or ‘modern’ is nothing 
but a degree of  scale in which material 
(i.e., technological) resources are 
employed; in other words, technology 
is a way of  building society on a larger 
more complex scale – in this sense, the 
idea is reinforced that technology is 
social and is what allows resources to 
NatioNal iNstitute of advaNced studies
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be woven together into durable social 
links.37 Hence, technological artefacts 
cannot be studied in their isolation, 
social links are not only about human 
associations, and we must acknowledge 
that artefacts are social ties; i.e., technical 
artefacts are the ties that constitute and 
reproduce human societies, they are 
extensions of  ourselves (in the context 
of  interdependencies), and must be 
studied for their relational properties.38 
Technology, according to Michel Callon, 
therefore, is an effective sociological 
tool of  analysis.
An approach that supplements 
Callon’s assertion more than ANT does, 
which draws from Langdon Winner 
more directly, and which is more 
immediately applicable to our enquiry 
here on technology and inequality is 
the SCOT (Social Construction of  
Technology) framework as developed 
by Wiebe Bijker, Thomas Hughes, and 
Trevor Pinch. Expounding the ‘seamless 
web’ concept more definitively, the 
emphasis in SCOT, born out of  social 
determinism, is on how technology 
cannot be understood outside of  
its social context, and that while 
37 Though it must be warned that low complexity 
in technology need not necessarily imply low 
complexity of  society; one only has to think 
of  aboriginal societies to confirm this (Ingold 
1997).
38 Zheng 2009
technologies do indeed interlock with 
people, it is people who ultimately act 
and make decisions about the purposes 
of  technology.39 The SCOT framework 
exemplifies the sociological analysis 
of  technology by virtue of  its robust 
acknowledgement of  the stabilisation 
of  artefacts in a society as subject to 
that group’s politics; therefore, we 
need to acknowledge the interpretative 
flexibility of  socio-technological 
ensembles.40 When a technological 
system grows by investments (capital, 
technological, and human), it build up 
a ‘technological momentum,’ acquiring 
a certain directional development and 
speed, and finally stability.41 Devoid of  
such an understanding, we as analysts of  
technology will only reproduce already 
stabilised meanings of  technological 
artefacts but will also miss opportunities 
for intervention. In such an approach, as 
explained by Bijker,42 we appreciate the 
diversity in meaning for a technological 
device by social groups (that is what 
is termed ‘interpretative flexibility’ 
above), which arises as a product of  
interactions by its members, through 
which emerges a certain stability in 
meaning and interpretation. All these 
processes operate within (and in turn 
39 Faulkner et al. 2010; Toyama, 2015
40 Bijker, 1997; Bijker et al. 2012
41 Bijker 2010
42 Bijker 2010
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build) a technological frame which is 
a broader technological paradigm43 
(similar, but not identical, to a Kuhnian 
paradigm) comprising tacit knowledge, 
procedures, goals, and techniques of  
technological problem-solving. In this 
manner, interactions between members 
of  a social group play a significant role 
in the evolution of  a particular form of  
technology. The SCOT approach can 
be engaged with when we understand 
the domestication of  technologies too. 
According to Oudhsoorn and Pinch44 
there are four phases of  domestication 
of  a technology – appropriation, 
objectification, incorporation, and 
conversion. Appropriation occurs 
when a technological artefact is sold 
to a consumer and owned by a person, 
43 A technological paradigm, elaborated in the 
celebrated work of  Dosi (1982), is analogous to 
the Kuhnian ‘scientific paradigm.’ It is a model 
or pattern of  solution of  selected technological 
problems, based on selected principles derived 
from natural sciences and on selected material 
technologies. Technological trajectories are 
possible technological directions bounded by 
the paradigm they operate within. Technological 
trajectories are patterns of  normal problem 
solving activities, i.e., as multi-dimensional trade-
offs among the technological variables which 
the paradigm defines as relevant. Economic 
and institutional factors have a major role in the 
selection and establishment of  technological 
paradigms. There may be complementary or 
competing technological trajectories, due to 
variations in potency and power, and even lock-
ins.
44 Oudshoorn and Pinch 2003
and objectification processes reveal the 
norms and principles of  the individual’s 
or group’s sense of  itself  and its 
place in the world. The focus for us, 
however, is on incorporation (how the 
device is used in the routines of  daily 
life) and conversion (how the device 
shapes relationships between its users 
and other people). Appropriation and 
objectification occur in (continually) 
constructed spatial environments, while 
incorporation is heavily determined 
by social variables such as gender and 
age. In fact, incorporation can even 
reinforce the culture of  the technology, 
such as its embedded masculinity. 
Similarly, conversion defines the 
relationship between the user and one’s 
external world (outside the household, 
caste group, or neighbourhood), in 
the process claiming a status in the 
wider society. Hence, the complexity 
of  technological experience intensifies, 
as it is not simply about a device that 
is restricted within the individual 
domain (or even within a household’s 
domain, such as a refrigerator), but 
rather about a medium of  interaction 
between individuals and social groups, 
therefore doubly articulating both 
private and public domains.45 Clearly, 
there are much broader cultural and 
sociological concerns than just who 
45 Silverstone et al. 1992
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owns a technological artefact, arising 
out of  the fact that the non-neutrality 
of  technology is what brings differential 
experiences across cultures.46 In 
the context of  our study, the social 
construction of  an artefact’s usage 
is conditioned greatly not only by 
ownership or the relationships between 
individuals and their peers in a society, 
but importantly by incorporation and 
conversion, which rest on contemporary 
social conditions and aspirations or 
even prestige.
This is why societies have contrasting 
experiences with technologies, why 
technology is essentially socially 
constructed (as much as it weaves 
society in turn), and why technologies 
comfortably operate with inequalities 
therein. Apart from Bijker and his co-
scholars, others47 have also empirically 
demonstrated this non-universality of  
technology, society, and inequality – 
that people’s use of  technologies in 
their social contexts (and conditions 
of  inequality) are what shape societies 
and technologies together, what builds 
the seamless web of  technology and 
society, and what probably determines 
its role in development. This now calls 
46 Bell 2006a 2006b; Sarukkai 2008
47 Such as Schwartz-Cowan 1987; Wajcman, 
various; Best and Maier 2007; Morozov 2011 
and 2013; Ahmed et al. 2014; Lupton 2015; 
Kamath 2020
for reviewing the critique of  whether 
technology can, genuinely, serve as a 
harbinger of  modernity.
The Promise of Modernity
Technology has moved out of  being 
solely an urban phenomenon, with 
several artefacts becoming ‘emerging 
technologies’ even in the rural, with 
their own novel experiences, having 
escaped from being usurped by any 
single (or dominant) social group 
and having emerged as potential 
harbingers of  change.48 In this way, 
many technologies have ceased to 
remain, in Partha Chatterjee’s terms, 
as ‘someone else’s modernity’ to be 
imported and consumed.49 So many 
technological artefacts have facilitated 
supportive relationships between 
people in various economic activities. 
Technological imaginaries around 
such artefacts have come about due to 
collectively held visions of  ‘modernity,’ 
stabilised and publicly performed based 
on shared understandings of  social 
life and aspirations, with artefacts 
proxying as materialised indicators of  
these aspirations.50 But, even if  not 
succumbing to solutionist temptations 
of  casting them as silver bullets, there 
has been for too long a disappointing 
48 Arnold 2013
49 Ibid.
50 Borup et al. 2006; Jasanoff  2015a, 2015b
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notion that ‘modernity’ is confined 
entirely within a technological frame, 
with little reference to social, cultural, 
and political engagements, inclining 
towards a belief  that ‘technical progress 
equals social progress.’51 Such narratives 
around modernity have become the 
drivers of  political and economic 
projects; governments have subscribed 
to these ideas too, courting major figures 
from the technology industry, with an 
unquestioning stand on the character 
of  progress drawn by technology.52 The 
visual pageantry of  individually-owned 
digital gadgetry, and little else, usually 
ends up emerging as an exhibition 
of  modernity. All this is propelled 
by technological determinism, based 
on conceptualisations of  modernity 
that glorify technology as the ‘prime-
mover’ of  history, releasing forces of  
modernism.53 Hence, unfortunately, 
what has been enthusiastically imported 
as ‘modernity’ is actually the spectacle 
of  merely technical materiality, without 
the political shifts that need to be 
undertaken foundationally and the 
cultural shifts that need to be undertaken 
behaviourally, which explains the wide-
prevalent glamour of  sleek gadgets in 
everyday private and social life.54 And 
51 Beck 1992
52 O’Hara 2020
53 Marx and Smith, 1994; Jongergen 2008
54 Baudrillard 1987
to top it, the state and its policymaking 
processes subscribe mostly to an elite 
construction of  technology that easily 
reproduces and perpetuates existing 
inequality.55
In the context of  India, Dipankar 
Gupta56 has revealed that modernity 
has been mistakenly equated, all too 
routinely, with the possession and 
symbolic visibility of  technological 
artefacts, and with little in the way of  
dismantling regressive socioeconomic 
conditions and improving social ethics 
and universalistic norms of  merit and 
equity and justice (which are features 
of  genuine modernity, by which people 
can live and operate with dignity and 
realise their aspirations). This is similar 
to a convenient (and slack) imagination 
of  modernity as a departure from 
‘savage’ or ‘primitive’ society to a 
more ‘advanced’ one defined by the 
prevalence of  complex and sleek 
technologies. But the issue is far more 
complex. One of  the prime reasons for 
these mistaken notions of  modernity is 
that the technical and the social – and 
the modernities thereof  – are separately 
studied, due to which the true nature 
of  the reverberations of  technology 
at economic, political, religious, and 
cultural levels is little understood.57 
55 Cartier et al. 2005
56 Gupta 2000
57 Feenberg 1999, 2010
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Andrew Feenberg explains how the fate 
of  society is bound to our understanding 
of  technology, and therefore on its 
repercussions upon inequality and 
development as well. This is why a 
shallow understanding of  technology 
– and the convenience with presenting 
technological modernity as a singular 
and revolutionary state than modernity 
in its more genuine form – can result 
in the preservation and reproduction 
of  debilitating social structures and 
hierarchies, and resultant economic 
processes.58 The handiness of  such 
a stunted unidirectional perception 
extends, as O’Hara59 comments, that 
progress in the technological dimension 
correlates with progress in other 
spheres, in a simplistic two-dimensional 
direction from ‘backward to forward’ 
or from ‘periphery’ (i.e., the rural and 
remote) to ‘centre’ (i.e., ‘smart spaces’ 
such as the urban). 
This is why a tactile and 
materialistic imaginary of  ‘technology-
led development’ so easily comes 
about, seen too often in celebrations 
of  encouraging statistical data on 
widespread permeation of  digital devices 
such as the mobile phone into Indian 
society, and through visual gratification 
from or isolated ethnographic anecdotes 
58 Veak 2000; O’Hara 2020
59 O’Hara 2020
on impoverished and subaltern 
communities partaking a share in the 
digital experience. Such imaginaries of  
modernity flourish within spaces of  
politics60, which are themselves highly 
regressive in their deliberations, if  
not just myopic. Clearly, even visibly, 
technological duality has become a 
striking characteristic of  the Indian socio-
technical landscape61, with technological 
inclusion comfortably coexisting 
with socio-economic deprivation62, 
despite the well-established fact that 
technology resides and operates in a 
socio-economic crucible and that the 
two should ideally provide concomitant 
(hopefully positive) feedback effects 
to one another. This is what has 
materialised due to the success of  a 
myopic symbolism that is content with 
technological materiality, with devices 
proxying as emblems of  modernity63, 
or in other words, a fulfilment with a 
purely visual and tactile socio-technical 
imaginary, instead of  a true socio-
technical modernity that facilitates 
escape from squalor. Hence, questions 
arise on whether modernity in a genuine 
sense can be realised with technological 
permeation, i.e., are inequalities, 
vulnerabilities, and precarities at all 
60 Jasanoff  2015a, 2015b
61 Arnold 2013
62 Zheng 2009
63 Baudrillard 1987; Arnold 2013
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diminished by the omnipresence of  
technology in turbulent settings? Do 
new forms of  subalternity emerge with, 
and through technological modernity?64
With society and technology being 
a seamless web65, not just technological 
exclusion in terms of  device ownership 
but socio-technological exclusion and 
the resultant impact on human agency 
ought to be factored into the analysis 
of  inequality, if  we need to address 
the above questions. Assessments 
of  technological participation ought 
to be about understanding whether 
technology has been leveraged for 
greater emancipation and more genuine 
imaginaries of  modernity. We need to 
examine technological dualities that 
pervert the quest for modernity in socio-
economic life, and whether we can move 
beyond simply device modernisation 
and into more meaningful modernity. 
Both, for the everyday life of  an 
individual as well as for the greater 
vision of  development. This, then, 
leads us to understand the effects of  
technology on agency, capability, and 
human development.
An Amplifier of Agency
An ensuing question from the 
above discussion is whether, and 
how, technology can convert-
64 Arnold 2013
65 Bijker et al. 1987
transform-translate into capabilities 
and functionings for human dignity 
(minimum levels of  capabilities), 
excellence (maximising levels of  
capability), and enhancement (changing 
the capabilities by technological or 
other means).66 Technological artefacts 
are supposed to help people overcome 
restrictions to agency, and expand and 
achieve greater capabilities and translate 
into enhanced functionings in order to 
lead the lives they value and aspire to.67 
And this is not merely an aspiration 
– technological artefacts can indeed 
be harnessed as ‘capability inputs’ for 
their transformative potential to extend 
capabilities, and improve functionings 
and aspirational possibilities, because 
there is an enormous amount 
of  evidence that they are agentive 
amplifiers.68 This is not only about what 
technological devices can directly enable 
people to do, but also about what their 
ubiquitous presence can advance in a 
wider sense; that is, not only replicating, 
amplifying, and supplementing bodily 
and mental faculties, but also extending 
cognitive possibilities and the human 
will in a much more expansive sense.69 
Existing capabilities (such as literacy 
66 Coeckelbergh 2011
67 Zheng 2009
68 Lawson 2010; van den Hoven 2012; Haenssgen 
and Ariana 2018
69 Lawson 2010; Oosterlaken 2011, 2012; 
Oosterlaken and van den Hoven 2012
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and entrepreneurial or other skills) can 
be supplemented by multiplier effects 
from technological artefacts, giving 
people greater control and agency.70 
This process of  agency 
amplification to transform the potential 
within artefacts into actual human 
functionings will require processes of  
conversion (of  commodity to capability, 
attributed to Amartya Sen) and translation 
(of  human and non-human materials 
into situated forms of  agency and 
association, attributed to Bruno Latour), 
which would require complementarities 
with other technologies and with 
socio-economic conditions, and of  
course with equalising of  interpersonal 
variation in technological usage.71 More 
70 Gigler 2008; Dasuki et al. 2014
71 See Kullman and Lee (2012); Haenssgen 
and Ariana (2018). Kullman and Lee (2012) 
explain how Sen is concerned with the means 
by which self-determination can be fostered in 
populations who have experienced political and 
economic oppression, while Latour is interested 
in the self-comprehension of  the developed 
world in its relation to technology and nature. 
They argue that both interests are not at odds, 
since Sen’s emphasis on individual agency at the 
expense of  collective action is supplemented 
by Latour’s relational notion of  agency. Hence, 
Sen’s ‘conversion’ and Latour’s ‘translation’ are 
reconciled with their structural resemblance 
and common exploration of  technological 
involvement in individuals’ liberation in their 
everyday social and material environments; 
despite Sen’s concerns about self-determination 
among those experiencing political and 
economic oppression and Latour’s concerns 
about self-comprehension of  the relationship 
between technology and nature.
than just ‘inputs’ or ‘commodities’, 
technologies in their interactions with 
the social contexts they are embedded 
in, hold transformative properties 
that build informational capital, assist 
social and environmental conversion 
factors, improve safety and append 
livelihoods, and help maintain important 
relationships in families that are 
separated due to distant employment.72 
Technologies can enhance access to a 
broad range of  other assets including 
political resources and social capital.73 
These are what can enable technologies 
to translate and convert possibilities 
into actual functionings. However, 
we must be mindful of  the fact that 
because capabilities are multiple, 
complex, and incommensurable, is it 
possible for technology to contract the 
capabilities of  some groups as much as 
to expand the aspirations of  others, and 
to have differential effects even across 
the short- and long-term; i.e., capability 
effects of  technology may be intended 
or unintended, expected or unexpected, 
and are generally complicated.74 
Similarly, technologies with the potential 
to improve social reality and promote 
emancipation may end up with opposite 
effects because social and economic 
72 Gigler 2008; Zheng 2009; Dasuki et al. 2014; 
Haenssgen and Ariana 2018
73 Duncombe 2006
74 van den Hoven 2012; Johnstone 2012
A TechnologicAl enquiry inTo inequAliTy
17
structures influence the values and 
politics on which technologies are 
built.75 Some of  the negative effects 
may be foreseeable and preventable, 
either by adapting the technology or by 
intervening in other complementarities 
and supportive structures.76 
Hence, the role of  technology in 
capabilities and functionings is anything 
but predictable (or straightforward in its 
instrumentality) given the material and 
social circumstances of  operation, and 
the fact that even conversion factors 
modulate and interact with changing 
social conditions.77 This implies, vitally, 
that serious evaluations of  translation 
and conversion possibilities during 
technological interventions must assess 
what capabilities the technologies 
contribute to, for whom, under what 
circumstances, and what the enablers 
and barriers are.78 Such evaluations 
eschew any automatic linkages between 
technology and capability, and embrace 
considerations of  not only the proposed 
positive outcomes of  these interventions 
but also the inequalities and restrictions 
that impede technologies from fuelling 
capabilities and ushering in genuine 
75 Zheng and Stahl 2009
76 Johnstone 2012
77 Zheng and Walsham 2008; Zheng and Stahl 
2009
78 Zheng and Stahl 2012
modernity.79 Such an approach would 
also allow space for the working with 
the bi-directional nature of  conversion 
factors and technology inputs, and for 
the relationship between technology 
and other complementary conversion 
factors in the socio-political setting 
(in terms of  how one influences, or 
transforms, the impacts of  the other – 
i.e., their ‘transformative dimensions’).80
For all this to materialise, individuals, 
social structures, and technical artefacts 
are to work in harmony to achieve 
causal efficacy, because each one 
enables changes in the others and 
together they reshape core capabilities;81 
this implies that in a broader assessment 
of  capability deprivation, which must 
embrace a normative framework to 
include technology and information, 
socio-technological exclusion must 
be evaluated critically at a variety 
79 Ibid.
80 See Haenssgen and Ariana (2018) for more 
on conceptions of  technology in the literature 
on the capability approach. See also Tshivhase 
et al. (2016) for a rich review of  literature on 
the application of  the capability approach into 
the ICT4D (Information and Communication 
Technologies for Development) approach. 
Also see Bajmocy and Gebert (2014) for the 
relationship between technological change and 
well-being in the capability approach.
81 In fact, van den Hoven (2012) even explicates on 
more unexplored relations between technology 
and the capability approach in what he terms as 
the capability-technology-affinity (CTA) thesis.
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of  levels.82 These levels range from 
policy evaluations right at the top, 
to the planning and implementation 
of  development interventions, and 
right down to local-level analyses of  
socio-technological conditions.83 This 
reiterates the fact that merely the 
distribution of  devices is insufficient, 
and that social exclusion and inequalities 
can be overcome with technological 
ownership and intervention only when 
the flow of  information and when 
opening up venues of  socio-economic 
and political participation by means of  
these technologies (thereby expanding 
people’s capabilities and aspirations) are 
genuinely successful.84 
Hence, it ought to be clear by now 
that though technologies must generally 
be evaluated for their role in human 
capabilities to help lead flourishing lives, 
there is no direct and causal relationship 
between technology and human 
development, because the relationship 
between individuals and technologies 
are steeped within a specific local, 
cultural, and sociopolitical contexts.85 In 
other words, technology is not simply 
‘yet another input’ to development since 
82 Zheng 2009; Coeckelbergh 2011; Oosterlaken 
2011; Johnstone 2012; van den Hoven, 2012; 
Dasuki et al. 2014
83 Johnstone 2012
84 Zheng and Walsham 2008
85 Gigler 2008; van den Hoven 2012
its linkage to the social context renders 
technology inseparable from other 
inputs.86 This reinforces the fact that for 
a technological device to facilitate the 
dilution or elimination of  inequalities, 
adhering to its scripted role in facilitating 
positive developmental outcomes, it 
has to work through the giant web 
of  socio-economic and technological 
interdependencies between technologies 
and social structures.87 Capabilities 
(both core and specific new ones) 
modulate with technological and social 
context, which means that the end/
means scheme as applied to the relation 
between capabilities and technology 
must be replaced by a hermeneutics 
of  ‘techno-human change,’ involving 
the use of  the capability approach in 
a way that highlights its interpretative 
dimension.88
Based on this package of  arguments 
is a well-formed critical theoretisation of  
technology and the capability approach 
by Zheng and Stahl89 termed a ‘critical 
capability approach to technology’ 
(CCAT). Similar to SCOT, they argue for 
a reflection on technology not only in an 
individual capacity but also factoring in 
evaluation of  society that is conducive 
to such reflection. The foundation for 
86 Johnstone 2012; Haenssgen and Ariana 2018
87 Lawson 2010; Oosterlaken 2011
88 Coeckelbergh 2011
89 Zheng and Stahl 2011, 2012
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CCAT lies in four principles: human-
centred technological development, 
human diversity, protection of  human 
agency, and democratic discourse. 
The approach situates agency as a key 
element for the critical evaluation of  
socio-cultural arrangements while 
assessing technology’s role in well-being; 
in this process, the very conception of  
technology, the conception of  agency, 
and the methodological implications 
of  the two, gain centrality. While for 
our analysis here on technology and 
inequality we do not borrow CCAT 
verbatim, we are inspired by what Zheng 
and Stahl90, eschewing universalism in 
technological analysis or absolutism 
between technology and human 
development, pose as central questions: 
“what capabilities does the technology 
contribute? For whom? Under what 
circumstances? What are the enabling 
factors and what are the barriers?”91
Connecting back to our earlier 
discussion, Modernity, therefore, does 
not become either an abstract notion 
or a mundane numerical figure of  
technological device ownership, but 
freedom and agency in a rightful sense. 
Capability and associated functionings, 
in the same vein, also do not mean 
only operational technological skills (or 
90 Zheng and Stahl 2012
91 Ibid: page 11
merely ownership, in the commodity 
view of  technology), but those which 
append life opportunities.92 Deprivation, 
therefore, implies whether the individual 
suffers restrictions, both internal and 
external, and is not in a position to 
convert and translate from technology 
into capabilities and functionings.93 In 
other words, what is far more important 
than technological advancement among 
people is human empowerment and 
enhancement of  well-being and agency 
through technology – that is, not 
simply what technology can directly 
enable people to do, but also what the 
introduction of  technology brings about 
in a wider sense, valuing people’s agency 
and taking their felt needs and aspirations 
into account.94 This substantive 
‘freedom’ is in the sense of  liberation 
from (or, more importantly, within)95 
one’s social and material surroundings, 
which can be realised through gradual 
modifications in the everyday socio-
technological conditions, through 
92 Zheng 2009
93 Zheng and Stahl 2011, 2012
94 Zheng 2009; Oosterlaken 2011, 2012; 
Oosterlaken and van den Hoven 2012
95 Liberation within improves relations between 
people and their environments, which is more 
important than minimising dependencies 
between people and their surroundings (in the 
form of  some transcendent security) because 
building such relationships are central for 
individual and collective agency (Kullman and 
Lee 2012). 
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improving relationships between people, 
environments, and technologies, or even 
through psychological empowerment 
in the sense of  achievement and self-
esteem.96 At a more elevated pitch, 
technological modernity must also 
append capabilities and functionings 
which help buttress the struggle against 
political oppression and give a voice to 
the historically marginalised.97 
The Idea of a Divide
One technological artefact that was 
deployed as a political combat vehicle 
against oppression by the marginalised, 
primarily because of  its inexpensiveness 
and portability, was the bicycle in the 
1980s in India; but an even cheaper and 
more portable artefact arrived on the 
scene two decades later – the mobile 
phone.98 Robin Jeffrey has commented 
extensively on the incredibly democratic 
and ubiquitous nature of  this device in the 
Indian setting, proposing that it was the 
‘most disruptive device to hit humanity 
since shoes,’ often the first device 
poor people bought which give them a 
chance to work around structures and 
practices of  historical discrimination, 
an observation supported also by 
CK Prahlad who commented in 2006 
96 Gigler 2008; Kullman and Lee 2012; Zheng and 
Stahl 2011, 2012; Dasuki et al. 2014
97 Sen 2010
98 Jeffrey and Doron 2013
that the mobile phone opened up 
possibilities of  information capital to 
poor people, allowing them to work 
around exploitative middlemen. This 
device also opened up vast opportunities 
to build on one’s existing social capital 
– one of  the most important assets of  
livelihood for the deprived, which could 
potentially compensate for one’s low 
physical and financial capital – and help 
ameliorate poverty particularly in the 
rural and among deprived women.99 At 
low operating costs, the mobile phone 
could extend communication networks 
laden with social and information capital 
to remote regions and communities, to 
whom conventional communication 
technologies would take much longer 
to reach, if  they at all did.100 Much like 
how the sewing machine became an 
‘everyday technology’101, the mobile 
phone did not find itself  cornered and 
gobbled by any single (or a stratum of) 
caste or class alone – it was far more 
accessible to practically anyone who 
could afford a device and its operating 
costs (which appeared to even reduce in 
nominal and real terms every year).
On the face of  it, the mobile 
phone seemed the ideal device that 
99 Schilderman 2002; Cecchini and Scott 2003; 
Garai and Shardrach 2006; Mehta and Kalra 
2006; Mehta and Mehta 2014
100 World Bank 1999
101 Arnold 2013
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would steer every positive turn in the 
trajectory of  technology, modernity, 
information and social capital, agency, 
functioning, and ultimately human 
development. The mobile phone quickly 
became an important component 
of  the development toolkit, but it 
was soon realised that this, like other 
technologies, also aggravated inequities 
due to the fact that high-income groups 
were disproportionately ahead in terms 
of  possessing the skills and resources 
required to utilise it more effectively.102 
The mobile phone had the potential 
to exacerbate exclusion in already 
historically marginalised communities 
and regions.103 The mobile phone 
certainly changed some conditions – 
some very significantly – but “it did 
not reorder society”.104 It could be well 
suspected that the mobile phone was 
also overemphasised like many other 
technologies in development research, 
policy, and practice, and in the livelihoods 
approach?105 The question still remains 
whether it extends social capital, a much 
broader concern compared to whether 
it only appends existing social capital.106 
102 Saith 2008; Saith and Vijayabaskar 2008
103 As evidenced by Schilderman (2002) and Kamath 
(2018, 2020) who studied such communities in 
underserved regions
104 Jeffrey and Doron 2013: 121
105 Duncombe 2006
106 Warschauer 2003
But an even more pivotal concern 
is our very understanding of  what access 
to these technologies in the first place is 
about, conventionally termed the ‘digital 
divide.’ Is it simply about ownership of  
an object or access to an interface, as 
much as it actually is about whether one 
is able to convert the object or access 
into real capabilities and functionings?107 
At the level of  the household too, simply 
because there is a device at home, does 
that mean everyone uses it equally 
effectively, if  they use it at all?108 Is there 
a divide across caste, gender, language, 
age, region even among those who have 
access to these technologies? There are 
more questions than answers that the 
literature on the digital divide, and on 
the role of  mobile phone technologies 
in the development process. We engage 
with this debate, as follows.
It has been questioned as to 
whether the mainstream policy and 
academic literature on the digital divide 
has narrowly adopted only an economic 
viewpoint, focusing on physical access 
to devices and artefacts, or whether 
it has focused disproportionately on 
computers, mobile phones, and the 
internet; worse, has it neatly divided 
people into dichotomous categories of  
‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ in the context of  
107 Zheng and Stahl 2012
108 Bell 2006a, 2006b
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these technologies?109 Take for instance 
Deepak Kumar110, who, as late as 2006, 
was still concerned about “differential 
access to ICTs [being] at the root of  the 
existing digital divide”, in the process 
defining digital divide as the “ever 
growing gap between those people and 
communities who have access to ICTs 
and those who do not have it...the digital 
divide is first and foremost an issue of  
accessibility”.111 The writing by Deepak 
Kumar is perhaps not a defining work 
on the Indian digital divide, but is a very 
telling reflection of  the oversimplified 
policy and popular understanding 
around technological inequalities. By 
observing such simplistic and singular 
boundaries, the mainstream literature 
– for that matter the very conceptual 
and policy understanding of  the digital 
divide or technological inequality as 
such – glossed over more complex 
processes of  stratification.112 
Mark Warschauer113 signalled the 
issue early enough though, and assessed 
that the binary digital divide approach 
could fail to value the social resources 
and agency of  social groups. However, 
he explained, the digital divide in that 
understanding was a product of  the times, 
109 Fortunati 2008
110 Kumar 2006
111 Ibid: page 35
112 Halford and Savage 2010; Lupton 2015
113 Warschauer 2003
exhibiting a superficial examination 
of  technology’s relationship to socio-
economic processes as though ICTs 
created a parallel reality that could be 
accessed by leaping across a divide of  
sorts. Pre-empting the critical literature 
on digital divide, Warschauer explained 
two issues: first, that the (conventional) 
digital divide framework provides a 
poor roadmap for using ‘technology 
for development’ in a manner that 
over-emphasises the physical presence 
of  devices at the cost of  other 
factors that allow people to use these 
devices for meaningful ends (recall 
‘conversion’ and ‘translation’ from the 
section prior on agency), and second, 
that it connotes ‘digital solutions’ 
without engaging sufficiently with 
complementary resources (physical, 
technological, human, social) and 
complex interventions and conditions 
(technological and social contexts) to 
support social inclusion. Much later, the 
World Bank’s World Development Report 
2016: Digital Dividends clearly spelt out 
that ICTs may be critical but are not 
sufficient, and that digital interventions 
to bridge technological inequalities 
require ‘strong analogue foundations’ 
or ‘analogue complements’ which will 
enhance skills, capabilities, functionings, 
and individual agency, and will stress 
for accountable institutions and 
empowering socio-political structures. 
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Taking these ideas even further, 
Kentaro Toyama commented114 that 
the digital divide (in its conventional 
understanding) is actually a symptom 
than a cause because of  what he terms 
the ‘law of  amplification’ which argues 
that technology, even when equally 
distributed, “isn’t a bridge, but a jack” 
amplifying existing conditions. Low-
cost technology, Toyama continues, 
may not be an effective armament 
against inequality, because the outcomes 
of  technology differ proportionately 
to other underlying advantages. If  
the digital divide were truly binary 
and mostly about ownership of  
ICTs, the achievability of  ‘universal 
connectedness’ in any region would be a 
task that could be successful very swiftly. 
The conventional conceptualisation of  
digital divide, and hence technological 
inequality, therefore, seriously needed a 
major reworking.
Concurring with and drawing 
further from sociological framings 
of  technology such as SCOT, ANT, 
CCAT discussed in earlier sections, 
feminist theorisations questioned the 
conventional idea of  the digital divide 
and alternately propounded, what is 
best termed by Halford and Savage115 
as the idea of  digital social inequality. 
114 Toyama 2015: 49
115 Halford and Savage 2010
This is an approach that, at once, 
captures not only the ‘seamless web’ 
conceptualisation of  technology and 
society, but also the fact that technology 
and society in their joint dynamics 
can spawn (or break) inequalities, can 
append (or diminish) capabilities, can 
enhance (or deplete) skills, and can 
empower (or disempower) individual 
agency, and undermine (or reinforce) 
social structures – greatly due to the 
fact that technology and society work 
hand-in-hand, and are possibly even 
actants in the same network on one 
plane. We borrow the term ‘digital social 
inequality’ in its broader incarnation of 
socio-technological inequality. The feminist 
theorisation of  technology has also 
provided concepts to more effectively 
understand users of  a technology, 
differentiating them into ‘end users’, 
‘lay end users’, and ‘implicated actors.’116 
While the first two terms refer to 
those who are affected downstream 
by innovation and those who have 
been excluded from expert discourse, 
‘implicated actors’ include those 
who have been either not physically 
present but discursively constructed 
and targeted by technology developers, 
or those who are physically present 
but who have been generally silenced, 
116 Oudshoorn and Pinch, 2003; see also Wajcman, 
2004 and 2010
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ignored, or made invisible by those in 
power.
Very similar to ‘implicated actors,’ 
another useful conceptualisation around 
technological inequality that has emerged 
in the literature is the ‘information have-less,’ 
which also embraces the seamless-web 
paradigm of  thinking rather seriously by 
conceptualising not just the nature of  
technology and society, but the nature 
of  socio-technological deprivation 
among individuals and social groups. 
Studying China across the first decade 
of  the 21st century, Jack-Linchuan Qiu 
first employed this expression as an 
alternative to the conventional binary 
digital divide, to appreciate technological 
and informational stratification with a 
much more fine-grained, and realistic, 
approach of  observation and analysis. 
Qiu117 observed that there are 
hundreds of  millions of  people who 
have gained new access to low-end 
ICTs (these devices therefore becoming 
‘everyday technologies,’ employing 
David Arnold’s term), who also 
happen to be drawn (or pushed) to 
urban agglomerations in the neoliberal 
economy. Fusing the technological to 
the social, Qiu put forward that there 
is an entire socio-technological class 
that can be called the ‘information 
have-less’, which is a vast group of  
117 Qiu 2009, among his other works
people including migrant informal 
workers, those who seek to escape 
agrarian distress, those who have highly 
precarious and vulnerable working lives, 
and those who generally constitute the 
underclass in the city and peri-urban. 
There is a strong likelihood that every 
one of  these individuals possess a 
mobile phone, or even possess the skills 
to search something on Google, to watch 
videos on YouTube, perhaps operate an 
account on Facebook, and are able to 
send text messages and images through 
platforms such as WhatsApp. Have 
these individuals truly crossed towards 
the favourable side of  the digital divide 
canyon? Even on a preliminary thought, 
and certainly on empirical observation 
of  this category of  individuals, the 
answer may not be a simple affirmative. 
In the case of  India, this calls to mind 
the social groups and regions that are 
either dispossessed, or forcibly evicted 
from urban slums, or forced out of  their 
villages. They may possess a device such 
as a smartphone, will in all likelihood be 
able to conduct basic operations on the 
internet, possibly download a film that 
the family can watch, share content, and 
so on, but these individuals tangibly lack 
the effective participation in the ‘digital 
technological revolution’ either as 
creators or customers of  technological 
products and services; rather, they 
are simply passive consumers of  
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digital technologies on the margins, 
participating in the digital experience 
purely for casual interpersonal 
communication or entertainment. While 
the more empowered classes employ 
technology in the fight for democracy 
and justice, the majority of  the 
information have-less, Qiu observes, are 
occupied negotiating basic problems of  
life and living, using devices mainly for 
entertainment and consumption. The 
information have-less are hence rarely 
‘informed users’118 of  digital technology. 
They may own technological devices, 
use them as markers of  prestige and 
aspiration, and may use them recurrently, 
but are still alienated and disempowered 
in a larger sense of  citizenship and 
digital participation, which is clearly 
because these technologies operate 
within existing social conditions without 
changing those conditions.119
Once we open up our understanding 
of  socio-technological inequalities 
as not simply a matter of  ownership 
of  device, the mammoth scale of  the 
task and agenda ahead for reorienting 
technology policy becomes evident.120 
Naïveté in the state policy discourse 
around technology and development 
results in the interpretation of  the 
digital divide as simply e-inclusion in 
118 Webster, 2006; van Deursen and van Dijk 2014
119 Qiu, 2009
120 Halford and Savage, 2010
the sense of  ownership of  devices 
and access to information, rather than 
effective participation, demonstrating 
the erroneous inclination of  policy 
orientation towards technological 
determinism and solutionism.121 
Technological Experience in 
India
In India too, such a populous category 
of  the information have-less is glaringly 
visible, immediately observable around 
us, which the Indian policy and 
popular discourse on technology and 
development has entirely overlooked. 
Apart from the recognition that 
those among the poor who possess 
technological devices must be taught to 
‘use them better,’ this is routinely stated 
as a convenient pedagogic prescription 
and is in effect impotent in terms of  
effective technological participation 
since they remain passive consumers. 
Programs such as Digital India or 
the National Digital Literacy Mission 
speak of  ‘digital literacy,’ access to 
e-governance services, or improving 
digital infrastructure in terms of  device 
ownership and broadband highways. 
These programs are no doubt noble 
endeavours with little doubt about their 
intentions to expand the technological 
experience for the demographically 
121 Fortunati, 2008; Morozov, 2011 and 2013
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gigantic underclasses in India, but 
they are certainly myopic of  socio-
technological inequalities all over the 
country. A serious ‘worm’s eye view 
of  digital life’122 in Indian policy and 
academic discourses on technology is 
in want, but is conspicuously missing 
because they are heavily slanted 
towards technological determinism and 
solutionism. While these two terms 
have been mentioned in prior sections 
of  this paper, their relevance arises at 
this point when we finally arrive at the 
central question on technology and 
inequality.123
Despite abundant evidence that 
technology is not a sovereign entity 
and shares a reciprocal relationship 
with society (as seen throughout this 
paper), such a naturalisation seems to 
remain sturdy.124 Such an ascription of  
autonomic power to technology is what 
is termed ‘technological determinism,’ 
a classic example of  this being Karl 
Marx’s conviction that the introduction 
of  the railways in India would dissolve 
its caste system.125 Other examples 
of  technological determinism include 
placing the waterwheel as the founding 
artefact of  manorialism, the steam 
122 A term adapted from Krishna’s (2017) ‘worm’s 
eye view of  development.’
123 In this section, we borrow from Kamath (2020)
124 Bimber, 1990
125 Heilbroner, 1994
engine as that of  industrial society, or the 
stirrup that of  feudalism.126 The idea of  
technologies as driving forces of  history 
was developed within the paradigm that 
regarded new technological artefacts as 
a sure-shot means of  addressing social 
and politically defined goals catering 
to the objective of  social change.127 An 
offspring of  technological determinism 
is ‘technological solutionism,’ which 
brings with it the mindset that 
technology holds the self-determined 
potential to ameliorate the human 
condition.128 Technological solutionism 
employs a reductionist account of  the 
analysis of  development concerns 
to simplifiable ‘obstacles’ that can be 
overcome, disregarding any sociological 
or historical complexity of  either the 
concerns or the technological fix.129 
Such a solutionist inclination is not 
exclusive to our contemporary era or to 
digital technologies. Road transport and 
electrical technology were believed to 
be harbingers of  social transformation 
and social harmony in the West, back 
in the nineteenth century.130 During the 
same period, the Governors General of  
India Lord Dalhousie and Lord William 
Bentinck believed that the railways and 
126 Hughes, 1994
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the telegraph could break down the caste 
system and usher in modernity into this 
wretched subcontinent by which the 
Indian lot could be civilised, saved, and 
pulled-up towards the industrialised 
standards of  the West.131 Harriet 
Martineau’s vision, much like Bentinck’s, 
presented on how the railways would 
expand the otherwise immutable 
nature of  the Indian mind towards new 
horizons of  thought and practice.132 
David Arnold also cites instances from 
Indian fiction, with an intriguing episode 
from Mulk Raj Anand’s character – a 
manual scavenger traditionally and 
ritually obliged to handle human waste 
in India – viewing a flush toilet as an 
artefact that came with the promise of  
expunging caste from Indian society.133 
The idea is that the impact of  technology 
(conceived to be essentially a neutral 
entity) naturally flows from its inherent 
qualities, regardless of  context.134 
Both technological determinism and 
technological solutionism overlook the 
social foundations of  technological 
processes and outcomes, and severely 
compromise on multiplicity in 
conceptualisation, enquiry, and analysis. 
Technological determinism, argued 





especially in high industrial capitalism.135 
In an interesting similarity, the mindset 
of  technological determinism and 
solutionism in India gained traction 
especially over the last thirty years with 
the reorientation of  the state towards 
neoliberal capitalism.136 At the nucleus 
of  neoliberal capitalism has been the 
reorientation of  the state in affairs of  
political economy. The state, far from 
having withdrawn across-the-board 
for the benefit of  entrepreneurial 
potential and material prosperity, has 
in reality retracted for some while 
facilitating others, as a result of  which 
general socio-economic inequality has 
gained tremendous momentum. In 
tandem with this divergent political-
economic experience has been unequal 
technological experience too, with 
the affluent (and those closer to that 
strata) enjoying a strikingly different 
engagement with digital technologies 
– appending their prosperity in every 
dimension of  life and work – compared 
to those at the bottom (and closer to that 
strata) having either a non-empowering 
135 Heilbroner. (1967) explains how this is a 
peculiarity of  an era in Anglo-American 
economic history, from the mid-1800s to pre-
Depression 1900s.
136 There is ample evidence, though, that these 
tendencies towards technological determinism 
hark back decades prior to the 1991 industrial 
reforms. For a historical treatment of  this, see 
Kamath (2020).
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engagement with digital technology, or 
possibly even a disparaging technological 
experience. The acceleration of  
divergence in technological engagement 
has only been aggravating, becoming less 
democratic and universally beneficial, 
and certainly much more complicated 
that simply an issue of  access and 
ownership of  devices. This is especially 
evident, even visually, in the context 
of  digital technologies such as mobile 
phones. Compared to the public phone-
booths of  the yesteryears that were 
unequally distributed geographically 
but were more equally accessible 
devices immediately around their fixed 
locations, mobile phones may appear 
more ubiquitous but the magnitude 
of  inequality in their experience and 
impact across people, social groups, and 
regions, is much vaster. For some, the 
phone has proven to be emancipatory, 
while for others it has only aggravated 
disempowerment. For some, it is 
indispensable for livelihood or political 
participation, while for others it is purely 
an entertainment gadget. For some, it 
has meant freedom of  expression, while 
for others it has only meant being under 
the scrutiny of  further surveillance. 
This especially plays out in urban 
semi-formal work, known popularly as 
‘platform economy’ or ‘gig economy’ 
work (mobile-app based taxi services, 
food and goods delivery, etc.), where 
digital technology is not simply 
demanded for convenience but stands 
as the very foundation of  that economic 
sector. A deeply diseased agricultural 
sector, compounded by problematic 
neglect of  industrial manufacturing 
over the years, has pushed tens of  
thousands of  rural and small-town 
unemployed and frustrated young male 
workers into the metropolitan and peri-
urban, where what awaits them is semi-
formal low-quality high-stress work that 
depends on digital technology. There 
is little justification for calling this 
‘employment’ at all (appearing more like 
a string of  personalised tasks through 
the working day), copious evidence for 
calling these workers as the ‘information 
have-less,’ practically no genuine and 
long-lasting skill building, barely tapping 
or building any entrepreneurial skills or 
capabilities or meaningful functionings 
among them, a systematic resistance 
against their collective bargaining and 
empowerment, and certainly founded 
on the problematic technological-
determinist understanding of  
engagement with especially digital 
technology as some kind of  modernity 
in life and livelihood. 
While platform economy jobs 
appear to epitomise the complex 
technology-inequality conundrum, on 
a more aggregate scale has been the 
personalisation of  economic well-being 
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along with the increasing personalisation 
of  technology – these two not sharing 
a cause-effect relationship but certainly 
not disconnected with one another 
by virtue of  the reorientation of  the 
state and its consequent tendency 
towards technological determinism and 
solutionism. Of  course, the direction of  
the relationship is not simply ‘neoliberal 
capitalism influencing personalisation 
of  economic experience and hence 
technological inequality,’ but far more 
complicated with feedbacks operating 
between technological inequality, 
personalisation of  technology, and 
neoliberal capitalism – each reproducing 
one another (platform economy jobs 
being only one shining example). No 
doubt, the globalisation of  information 
and communication technologies, 
in general, is implicated as a critical 
ingredient in this.
While one can continue debating 
around the fruitfulness of  outcomes and 
whether these outcomes are self-created 
or are impacts of  macro processes, 
one feature appears that appears to 
be consistent is that, in the context of  
a transforming India, technological 
inequalities in socio-economic transition 
processes are generally believed to be 
ethically undesirable differences137 in 
almost all streams of  discourse. 
137 To use Pani’s (2017) conceptualisation
Mitigating Inequality
Social and economic inequality can be 
tackled by ushering in processes that 
actually convert technological ubiquity 
into progressive emancipatory everyday-
life choices. ‘Genuine’ modernity can be 
realised when technologies are inclusive, 
and are converted and translated into 
individual capabilities and realised 
functionings. Dualities in economy and 
society can be gradually melted down 
with technological inclusion working in 
tandem with socio-economic inclusion, 
and by moving beyond oversimplified 
materialities into more meaningful 
socio-technical imaginaries. We must 
enquire on how technologies – digital 
technologies more specifically – are 
being adopted by the marginalised and 
the subaltern and whether they have 
had empowerment effects, or whether 
transition forces have alienated and 
disempowered these groups.138 We 
need to explore whether technological 
optimism is well-founded and warranted, 
and whether it has and will actually 
undermine inequalities on the ground 
or create new divides.139 Technology can 
be a source of  progressive dynamism 
and more improved democratic 
participation in economy and society. 
It can be an instrument of  a new social 
138 Qiu 2009
139 Chandrasekhar 2001; Saith 2008
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order as much as it can be an instrument 
of  social emancipation140, if  we arrive at 
more dynamic notions of  inclusion and 
inequality, and imagine technology to 
be a terrain of  power, conflict, struggle, 
and negotiation.141 The evolutionary 
path of  technology can be appropriated 
for greater empowerment if  it can be 
steered by frameworks of  equity and 
social justice.142
For this, we need to start away 
from the centre and towards the 
bottom. We need to de-centre the 
analysis of  technology from the urban-
metropolitan (and industrial-economic 
or white-collar corporate) and restate 
it outside that ambit.143 Similarly144, we 
need to trim the domination of  the 
narrative of  technology away from the 
more privileged, and adopt a subaltern 
gaze in order to explicate on the 
exclusion mechanisms of  technological 
deployment that has aggravated 
inequality. We need to embrace the fact 
that technological divides are a graded 
spectrum of  inequality. We need to 
provoke and compel the discourses on 
technology and development in India to 
acknowledge the technologically less-
empowered (or even disempowered) as 
140 Foucault 1976
141 Fortunati 2008; Faulkner et al. 2010
142 ITfC 2015
143 Arnold 2013
144 Adapting from Corneliussen et al. (2018)
seriously as it engages with high-tech 
interventions in artificial intelligence 
and ‘smart’ solutions, and as easily as it 
correlates well-being with technological 
diffusion.145 We need to find out whether 
the digitally disenfranchised overlap 
with the historically socio-economically 
disadvantaged, and whether such 
technological disadvantaged-ness 
will dissolve itself  in time and with 
greater technological access.146 We need 
to ask whether participation in the 
‘technological revolution’ for the under-
recognised technological-underclasses 
has really facilitated grassroots social 
and informational networks to cope 
with economic transition, or has it only 
meant setting up small shops and cabins 
and selling mobile phone accessories to 
other members of  that underclass147, 
as observed particularly divisively in 
India. We need to understand that 
technological inequalities more often 
manifest as intangible differences 
(socio-technological inequalities which 
cannot be rectified simply by material 
or asset redistribution) than tangible 
differences (conventional digital divides 
or lack of  access to, say, the internet 
145 Fortunati 2008; Krishna 2017; Kamath 2020
146 As prodded by Nikhil Govind in a 2017 
discussion on ‘An information society for 
the future’ (https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=fTmpqY_ndeI, accessed 18 February 
2021).
147 Cartier et al. 2005
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which can be reduced or even removed 
by asset redistribution).148 We need to 
accept that while uneven ownership of  
devices can be an indicator of  tangible 
technological inequality, this cannot 
entirely reflect the intangible differentials 
and subsequent vulnerabilities that 
technological inequalities are associated 
with.
Whatever the intention or script 
that is ascribed to technology in its 
development and planning, it is de-
scripted and malleable to the logic of  
society and is situated in (and mirrors) 
the unequal power relationships that 
exist in that society.149 The inertia of  
social inequality forcefully restrains 
differentials in social capacity, and terms 
such as ‘modernisation’ or ‘leapfrogging’ 
become hollow as they ignore actual 
inequities on the ground and may even 
produce unintended consequences.150 
Technology needs to work with 
entitlements in health, education, in 
livelihood creation, valuable social 
capital network formation, and 
political participation, to strengthen 
both short- and long-term decision-
making capacities of  individuals and 
as well as the character of  surrounding 
148 Pani and Joshi, forthcoming
149 Feenberg 1999, 2010; Akrich 1997; Warschauer 
2003; Morozov 2011
150 Qiu 2009; Toyama 2015
institutional structures that reproduce 
inequalities.151 
Overall, inspired from Ruth 
Schwartz-Cowan152, if  we are to 
design and craft a sociological study 
of  technology and inequality, we 
need to align our enquiry with those 
aspects of  social change and inequality 
where technology is implicated. We 
need to grasp the magnitude of  the 
conceptualisation of  the technology-
inequality relationship and its role, 
ultimately, in human development. 
There are about 87.3 mobile phone 
subscriptions for every hundred 
individuals in India153; it appears that 
the digital divide (in its conventional 
understanding) has been practically 
bridged and that everyone can partake of  
a progressive and modern technological 
experience. But if  we broaden our 
understanding of  technological 
empowerment, if  we situate this in 
the context of  wider structural and 
operational inequalities, if  we factor-
in conceptualisations of  technological 
modernity, and embed this in socio-
economic transition processes, we arrive 
at a much more realistic understanding 
of  socio-technological inequality. 
151 Duncombe 2006
152 Schwartz-Cowan 1987
153 World Bank 2019
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The Way Ahead
Socio-economic inequality, on a stage 
of  economic neoliberalism and with 
the spectre of  caste still thriving, is an 
ambience that technology comfortably 
operates within. Social and economic 
transition processes are cauldrons that 
brew inequality, where technology 
functions as an important ingredient. 
At once, technology is a contributor to 
the forces that cause these transitions as 
well as a participant in the adaptations 
to and negotiations around these 
processes. This implies that the enquiry 
has to circle around both, the facilitative 
and negotiative relationship between 
technology and inequality within socio-
political processes. 
As we have seen in this review 
paper, technology interbreeds with 
existing inequalities by virtue of  
the fact that it is not simply a set of  
artefacts or assets but an integral social 
participant. The reconfigurations of  
social relations and economic processes 
during transition processes generates 
new technological inequalities that 
are ethically unacceptable. Multiple 
socio-technological trajectories are 
continually generated and mutated in 
conditions of  inequality through the 
everyday technological practices and 
experiences of  people and communities. 
Uncovering these trajectories emerges a 
pertinent task, motivating a sociological 
analysis of  technological inequality, 
and a technological analysis of  socio-
economic inequality. More specifically, 
we attend to the critical need for a 
study of  socio-technological inequality 
in the context of  the deep and wide 
permeation of  digital technologies in 
transitions of  everyday life and work in 
India.
The pervasiveness of  digital 
technologies has played a central 
role in livelihood transformations, in 
migration decisions and processes, as 
well as in the adaptation and negotiation 
strategies of  subaltern groups around 
political-economic transformations. 
It is important to explore patterns 
in socio-technological inequality and 
the instrumentalities therein, and to 
conceptualise them. A host of  pressing 
questions therefore emerge:
1. What are the expectations from 
digital technologies by people 
under the duress of  inequality, and 
by the state?
2. How does technology interact 
and interbreed, and mitigate, with 
dimensions of  inequality and their 
outcomes?
3. Do these technologies provide 
durability and stability against new 
socio-political inequalities?
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4. Do these technologies build 
informational assets or append 
livelihood opportunities? 
5. What is the nature of  gender and 
caste differentials? 
6. Is there a shared vision of  
technology and development at all?
7. What are the appropriate 
interventions to all these?
Addressing these enquiries provides 
lessons for the understanding of  the role 
of  technology in human development, 
which, after all, is the final mission. We 
need to critique the mainstream Indian 
discourse and meta-narrative around 
this role, and then bring out the true 
nature of  the relationship between 
technology and inequality. We need to 
unbox and refine our understanding 
of  the instrumentality of  technology 
on the lived experience of  inequality, 
and, in turn, of  the instrumentality 
of  inequality on the technological 
condition. Digital technologies are a 
new site for modern incarnations of  
inequality, given how they are a realm 
of  experience and activity not separate 
from the social. Uncovering socio-
technological inequalities is integral 
to charting out the realities of  socio-
economic transformation in terms of  
novel vulnerabilities, precarities, and 
uncertainties that these inequalities 
spawn. To comprehend this more 
acutely is why we need to pursue a study 
of  technology as a direction of  enquiry 
into inequality. 
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